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Abstract
All are agreed that orthodox economics is unsatisfactory but there is wide
disagreement, especially among heterodox critics, whether the problems lie
at the level of substantive theory or at the level of methodology. This paper
gives first an overview of the methodological questions at issue. The frame of
reference includes J. S. Mill, Jevons, Popper, Keynes, and Lawson. Drawing
on the conclusions, the domain of economics is subsequently refocused.
Human behavior is moved from the center to the periphery. From elementary
systemic properties the relation of income and profit is then consistently
derived. This solves the profit conundrum.
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One positive consequence of the ongoing economic crisis is that the
intellectual malaise of the modern academic discipline of economics is
becoming ever more widely recognised. (Lawson, 2012, p. 3), see also
(Colander et al., 2009), (Buiter, 2009), (Solow, 2010), (Stiglitz, 2011)
Except for the casualties, an economic crisis is good for many things. Defensive
heroism is the natural stance of the orthodoxy. After all, a crisis is the opportunity
to learn from mistakes.
. . . economists are in fact reenacting yet another round in what has
become by now an old ritual in the profession: past failures of the most
analytically sophisticated methods to gain much economic insight (as
is now the verdict on neoclassical analysis) are candidly acknowledged,
but then encouragement is offered for the economics profession to
press forward to develop still more analytically advanced methods . . .
(Nelson, 2006, p. 227)
For the heterodoxy it is an opportunity to make their point with more force and
convenient empirical evidences. Joan Robinson did so in The Second Crisis of
Economic Theory:
I am talking about the evident bankruptcy of economic theory which
for the second time has nothing to say on the questions that, to everyone
except economists, appear to be most in need of an answer. (Robinson,
1972, p. 9)
The first crisis, of course, was the Great Depression. Among Keynesians it was taken
as a self-evident refutation of orthodox economic theory. However, Keynesians
learned to their chagrin that this stratagem works both ways. The stagflation of the
1970s was taken as self-evident refutation of Keynesianism. The pattern is quite
clear: an economic crisis is at the same time a crisis of the ruling paradigm.
While certainly not denying the rhetorical usefulness of this kind of argumenta-
tion it nevertheless cannot be admitted in the dispute of competing paradigms. The
interrelation between economic theory and the actual performance of the economy
is too subtle as to allow for a straightforward causality. Moreover, critics are rarely
poised to accept the logically symmetrical argument that the relatively good perfor-
mance of the economy between crises is due to the ruling paradigm. And finally it
is worth remembering that
. . . there is no theory that is not beset with problems. (Popper, 1994, p.
157)
That there must be something better than orthodox economics, all are agreed
(including the orthodox), but this consensus is accompanied by a bookshelves-
filling disagreement about diagnosis and remedy. Regrettably the better theory is
not available when the next crisis hits. The rhetoric of failure is not of much help.
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The moral of the story is simply this: it takes a new theory, and not just
the destructive exposure of assumptions or the collection of new facts,
to beat an old theory. (Blaug, 1998, p. 703)
1 All are agreed – but on what?
As will become evident, there is more agreement on the defects of
orthodox theory than there is on what theory is to replace it: but
all agreed that the point of the criticism is to clear the ground for
construction. (Nell, 1980, p. 1)
Logical inconsistency:
. . . Keynes was simply arguing that microeconomic theory is false!
Presumably, it is false because it is not logically consistent with all
macrophenomena – such as persistent disequilibria – and thus, by
modus tollens, at least one of the assumptions of microtheory is false
and hence microtheory as a whole is false. (Boland, 2003, p. 143),
original emphasis
Shoddy argumentation:
The currently prevailing pattern of economic theorizing exhibits the
following three characteristics: (1) a syncopated style of argument
fluctuating back and forth between literary and symbolic modes of
expression, (2) naive translation, or the loose paraphrasing of formulae
into sentences, and (3) loose verbal reasoning for certain aspects of the-
oretical argumentation where explicit symbolic formulation is lacking.
(Dennis, 1982, p. 698)
Inappropriate copying of physics:
Thus many are inclined to blame inappropriate copying of physics
for the willingness of neoclassicals to tolerate bizarrely unrealistic
assumptions and to place everything historical, cultural, institutional,
and even psychological outside the framework of economic analysis.
(Porter, 1994, p. 128)
Borrowing the wrong concepts from mathematics:
The discipline of economics has so far successfully resisted all efforts
to alter its character as an exercise in how to reason deductively from
axiomatic principles. That is, it has insisted on remaining the Euclidean
geometry of the social sciences. (Eichner, 1979, p. 172)
Overemphasis of the mathematical method:
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It is thus not at all surprising that mainstream contributions are found
continually to be so unrealistic and explanatorily limited. The (mathe-
matical) method, or rather the emphasis placed upon it in the modern
economics academy, is the overriding problem. Lawson (2012, p. 3),
original emphasis
Misapplication of mathematics:
A second class of economists contain those who have abundantly em-
ployed mathematical apparatus, but, misunderstanding its true use, or
being otherwise diverted from a true theory, have built upon the sand.
(Jevons, 1911, p. xxv)
Mock precision:
Much economic theorising to-day suffers, I think, because it attempts
to apply highly precise and mathematical methods to material which is
itself much too vague to support such treatment. (Keynes, quoted in
Chick, 1998, p. 1864)
Lack of facts:
Next, the empirical background of economic science is definitively
inadequate. Our knowledge of the relevant facts of economics is in-
comparably smaller than that commanded in physics at the time when
the mathematization of that subject was achieved. ... It is due to the
combination of the above mentioned circumstances that mathematical
economics has not achieved very much. (von Neumann and Morgen-
stern, 2007, p. 4)
Inconclusiveness of facts:
Even econometricians using identical, or almost identical, data sets
are regularly found to produce quite contrasting conclusions, usually
with little attempt at explanation. The systematic result here, as the
econometrician Edward Leamer observes, is that: "hardly anyone takes
anyone else’s data analysis seriously". (Lawson, 2012, p. 9)
Denial of empirical refutation:
. . . suppose they [the economists] did reject all theories that were
empirically falsified . . . Nothing would be left standing; there would
be no economics. (Hands, 2001, p. 404), original emphasis
Misleading principles:
Now the rationality principle, which in the social sciences plays a role
somewhat analogous to the universal laws of the natural sciences, is
false, and if in addition the situational models are also false, then both




The notion that microeconomics is a branch of applied mathematics
does economists more credit than several possible alternative expla-
nations for its empirical weakness. ... It isolates the limitations of
the theory in a factual supposition about the determinants of human
behavior, one that economists share with all of us. But the supposition
we all share is false, and so economics rests on a purely contingent,
though nevertheless central, mistaken belief .... (Rosenberg, 1992, p.
247)
Lack of realism:
Upon leaving office, each new president of the American Economic
Association gives the expected speech showing that he knows full well
it is all just a game, and chastises his colleagues for not being more
realistic. (Hudson, 2010, p. 9)
Assumptionism:
Cunningham in 1891 remarked that in the choice of premises “it is not
always easy to tell when a professor of the dismal science is making a
joke” . . . (Viner, 1963, p. 12)
Ignorance of time and history dependence:
The notion of time is so primitive and basic an element in man’s
experience that its neglect by much economic theory constitutes an
incredible puzzle. This puzzle is attributable, perhaps, to the almost
irresistible lure of formalism – particularly one that cannot adequately
handle time. (Rizzo, 1979, p. 1)
History dependence stares us in the face . . . , but it is not the stuff of
pure theory. (Hahn, 1991, p. 48)
Ignorance of institutions:
In the earlier part of the century there were major conflicts between
institutional economists, who saw the particular arrangements by which
particular economies conducted their economic affairs as essential, and
neoclassical economists, who sought to see through these inessential
details to the underlying fundamental forces – the forces of demand
and supply. (Stiglitz, 1991, p. 136)
Counterfactual equilibrium and zero profits:
The Walrasian prices correspond to the Marshallian long-run equilib-
rium prices where every producer is making zero excess profits. . . .
But, from the macro perspective of of Walrasian general equilibrium,
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the total profits in this case cannot be other that zero (otherwise, we
would need a Santa Claus to provide the aggregated positive profit) . . .
(Boland, 2003, p. 150), original emphasis
Questionable foundational assumptions and unjustifiable policy advice:
Much of economic theory is based on three questionable assumptions:
(1) the world is deterministic; (2) decision makers act as if they know
the values of all relevant parameters; and (3) consumers and firms
respectively, act as if they were maximizing utility and profit. . . . In
order to tell the politicians and practitioners something about causes
and best means, the economist needs the true theory or else he has
not much more to offer than educated common sense or his personal
opinion. Economists derive theorems, make predictions, and (!) sug-
gest economic policies using arguments which explicitly or implicitly
postulate the validity of the first two assumptions mentioned above.
Such endeavors are unjustifiable unless it can be demonstrated that the
most important doctrines of economics are insensitive to a relaxation
of these two assumptions. (Stigum, 1991, pp. 29-30)
Wrong methodology:
The essence of contemporary mainstream economics does not lie at the
level of substantive theory as most of its critics suggest, but at the level
of methodology. (Lawson, 1997, p. 282)
Evasion of reality:
The modern history of economic theory is a tale of evasion of reality.
Faced with the challenge of these vast changes and vital problems for
over a century, it reacted by denying their existence in order to be able
to produce a scientific system, a smoothly-functioning self-balancing
model. (Balogh, 1982, p. 32)
No predictive capacity:
Economic theory seems permanently stuck at the level of generic pre-
dictions – predictions that some change will happen some time and
some place, without ever telling us when and where and how much of
a change will occur. (Rosenberg, 1994, p. 217)
An unfinished task:
It is good to have [the technically best study of equilibria], but perhaps
the time has now come to see whether it can serve in an analysis of how
economies behave. The most intellectually exciting question of our
subject remains: is it true that the pursuit of private interest produces
not chaos but coherence, and if so, how is it done? (?, p. 102)
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Lack of imagination:
In other words, the main developments in economics of the twentieth
century . . . had been more a matter of form than of substance. . . . Little
new of any great significance has been learned about the workings of
markets since Adam Smith and . . . Smith added much less to the
discussion than most economists have commonly supposed. (Nelson,
2006, p. 298)
Lack of convincing alternatives:
If one calls those individuals working in the field of microeconomic
foundations of Keynesian economics Keynesian-economic theorist,
then, as Hahn has said, these Keynesians were not much better. (Mor-
ishima, 1984, p. 57)
No future:
There seems to be a quiet confidence in the profession that we are
moving, if only slowly, towards a more scientific basis for economics.
... Paradoxically many of those who have contributed much to the de-
velopment of general equilibrium theory are less complacent. (Kirman,
1989, p. 126)
. . . anything based on this mock-up is unlikely to fly. (Hahn, 1981, p.
1036)
Ideological bias:
Evidently, the tools are not strong enough to discriminate among fun-
damentally different hypotheses, or at least not strong enough to over-
come differences in prior beliefs, beliefs which are often influenced by
ideological concerns. (Stiglitz, 1991, p. 134)
Political bias:
Broadly speaking, policies fall into two categories: laissez faire or
interventionist public regulation. Each set of advocates has its own
preferred mode of mathematical treatment, choosing the approach that
best bolsters their own conclusions. (Hudson, 2010, p. 6)
Lack of public assurance:
. . . it is clear that the public’s lack of faith in the scientific nature of




Suffice it to say that, in my opinion, what we presently possess by
way of so-called pure economic theory is objectively indistinguishable
from what the physicist Richard Feynman, in an unflattering sketch of
nonsense "science," called "cargo cult science". (Clower, 1994, p. 809)
Pre-science:
The position I now favor is that economics is a pre-science, rather
like astronomy before Copernicus, Brahe and Galileo. I still hold out
hope of better behavior in the future, but given the travesties of logic
and anti-empiricism that have been committed in its name, it would
be an insult to the other sciences to give economics even a tentative
membership of that field. (Keen, 2011, p. 158)
Counterproductive organization:
It could be argued, moreover, that the present organization of the
profession is itself a negative factor to the extent that the requirement
of rapidly obtained results discourages researchers from entering the
domains that are most uncertain (even if they are essential). (Benetti
and Cartelier, 1997, p. 215)
Reluctance to scrap obsolete intellectual capital . . .
Gary Becker has suggested that a substantial resistance to the accep-
tance of new ideas by scientists can be explained by two familiar
economic concepts. One is the concept of specific human capital: the
established scholar possesses a valuable capital asset in his command
over a particular body of knowledge. That capital would be reduced if
his knowledge were made obsolete by the general acceptance of a new
theory. Hence, established scholars should, in their own self-interest,
attack new theories, possibly even more than they do in the absence of
joint action. The second concept is risk aversion, which leads young
scholars to prefer mastery of established theories to seeking radically
different theories. Scientific innovators, like adventurers in general, are
probably not averse to risk, but for the mass of scholars in a discipline,
risk aversion is a strong basis for scientific conservatism. (Stigler, 1983,
p. 538), see also (Sy, 2012, pp. 71-73)
. . . or just waiting for the heterodox to deliver?
There is no evidence to suggest that economists abandon degenerating
programs in the absence of a progressive alternative. We do not, in the
face of falsified theories in the belt of a program, abandon that program
until there is an alternative program with theories that are themselves
corroborated. (Weintraub, 1985, p. 148)
... if you think you can do better with a non-neoclassical model ..., then
you are quite welcome to try. (Boland, 1992, p. 19)
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2 Demarcation: The birth of science out of the spirit of the myth
. . . since we are all humans everything reduces to psychology (Boland,
2003, p. 107)
Myth, well told, is still the most convincing way to explain how the world and
humankind came to be in their present form. To recall, Zeus oversaw the universe,
assigned the various gods their roles, and was known for his erotic escapades.
Zeus had a lot of trouble. At Prometheus, for example, he was angry for being
tricked on sacrifices, stealing fire for man, and for refusing to tell him which of
his children would dethrone him. To handle their controversies the Olympian
agents regularly fell back to chicanery and violence. Purified from all religious
connotations myth is the tried and tested raw material of art, history, soap-opera and
small talk. Psychologism is the most congenial mode of explanation. The ancient
Greeks regarded myths as ‘true stories’ and distinguished them from fables as ‘false
stories’. Xenophanes made his contemporaries aware that their true stories were
what is now called a projection (Popper, 1994, p. 39).
With this, the problem of demarcation arose for the first time. And it was
easily solved. The Pre-Socratics rejected the mythological explanations of the world
because they saw that everything could be explained by the human-like actions
of gods which meant on closer inspection: nothing. This methodological insight
set science on its track. Rejecting gods as valid explanation, however, caused an
obvious problem. If myth is not truth, what then is truth? And to this question
the Pre-Socratics could not offer an immediate answer but only a vague research
program. They sought the material principle of things and they came up with
different answers.1 This was not an entirely satisfactory outcome because, as a
matter of principle, only one of the answers could be true. The demarcation problem
appeared in a new form within the compass of the infant science. All finer points of
methodology are derivatives of the primordial demarcation.
The finer points arose quite naturally. It is easy to keep Zeus out of the discussion.
But what about notions like the Absolute, the One, Logos; and what about the
invisible atom or the somewhat fantastic harmony of numbers, music, and celestial
spheres? Demarcation became more subtle. Basically however, it remained a purely
methodological question.
The problem of finding a criterion which would enable us to distinguish
between the empirical sciences on the one hand, and mathematics and
logic as well as ‘metaphysical’ systems on the other, I call the problem
of demarcation. This problem was known to Hume who attempted
to solve it. With Kant it became the central problem in the theory of
knowledge. (Popper, 1980, p. 34), original emphasis
1 For short overviews see Wikipedia under Mythology and Pre-Socratic Philosophy For a pertinent
account of the Pythagorean synthesis see (Koestler, 1979, pp. 27-42)
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Being humans, ‘a muddled horde of erring mortals, always in two minds about
things’ (Parmenides), it was inevitable that demarcation eventually became a social
issue. The early philosopher-scientists organized themselves in schools (cf. Fleck,
1980) and this brought with it the necessity to define their relations towards their
social and political surroundings. This they did. The Pythagoreans preferred to
keep their thoughts and findings for themselves. Others spoke on the agora to their
fellow-citizens. Demarcation was a real issue.
In our day McCloskey solved the demarcation problem by simple deconstruction,
that is, by muddling the epistemic and the social. After all, the pursuit of scientific
truth, whatever that may be, is undeniably a social activity and, as things are,
ultimately boils down to the usual social status quarrels.
In practice methodology serves chiefly to demarcate Us from Them,
demarcating science from nonscience. Once the modernist have found
a Bantustan for nonscience such as astrology, psychoanalysis, acupunc-
ture, nutritional medicine, Marxist economics, spoonbending, or any-
thing else they do not wish to discuss, they can get on with the business
at hand with a clear head. Methodology and its corollary, the Demar-
cation Problem (What is Science? How is It to be distinguished from
nonscience?), are ways at stopping conversation by limiting conversa-
tion to people on our side of the demarcation line. (McCloskey, 1998,
p. 161)
Popper, for one, was as clear on the difference between epistemic demarcation and
social discrimination as anyone could wish. And he was quite explicit that he was
not much interested in the latter.
And my doubts increase when I remember that what is to be called a
‘science’ and who is to be called a ‘scientist’ must always remain a
matter of convention or decision. (Popper, 1980, p. 52)
Within McCloskey’s framework of rhetoric the demarcation problem is correctly
perceived as a conversation-stopper. Rhetoric as a discipline becomes pointless if
conversation dries up, hence it has to keep out, not gods, but conversation-stoppers.
Rhetoric itself faces the demarcation problem, albeit in a different guise. What is
more, conversation per se is the ideal of the talk-show, not of science. Here, the
regulative idea is quite different.
A critical discussion is well-conducted if it is entirely devoted to one
aim: to find a flaw in the claim that a certain theory presents a solution
to a certain problem. . . . Thus critical discussion is essentially a
comparison of the merits and demerits of two or more theories . . . The
chief demerit is inconsistency, including inconsistency with the results
of experiments that a competing theory can explain. (Popper, 1994, pp.
160-161)
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The demarcation problem cannot be muddled away and it cannot be solved once
and for all.
. . . we have seen that a characteristic feature of science is that it
develops canons of rationality for evaluating knowledge claims and
deciding what to admit into the domain of knowledge. . . . these canons
of rationality change, evolve, and become more sophisticated as science
develops. (Suppe, 1977, p. 724)
To date the demarcation problem has not been answered satisfactorily for economics.
Economics is a perplexing subject. Though I have spent the better part
of my academic career thinking about its aims and methods, I have
never been confident that I or anyone else for that matter really under-
stand its cognitive status. . . . Without assurance about the cognitive
status of the theory; there is no basis of confidence in it. (Rosenberg,
1994, pp. 216-217), see also (Kirman, 1997, pp. 98-99)
3 J. S. Mill: The denial of methodological individualism before its
invention
As we shall see, general economic equilibrium theory originated and
developed in the context of a project put forward in varying forms by
different scholars to repeat Newton’s titanic achievement . . . (Ingrao
and Israel, 1990, pp. 33-34), see also (Redman, 1993, pp. 98, 108)
The ancient Greeks had excluded psychologism from the study of nature and
mathematics but it came back with double force in their inquiries of man and
society.
. . . the entire topic had become a scandal in the eighteenth century. If
scientific method could institute some degree of order in chemistry, in
physics, in astrophysics, in astronomy and so forth, why did we have
to be plunged into this dreadful chaos of conflicting opinions, with not
a thread to guide us? ... so that nobody is able to institute the kind of
order which Newton established in the great realm of nature? Naturally
enough, men’s wishes began to move towards the delineation of some
simple single principle which would guarantee just such order and yield
truths of just such an objective, general, lucid, irrefutable kind as had
so successfully been obtained concerning the external world. (Berlin,
2002, p. 9)
J. S. Mill tackled the problem head-on.
The phenomena with which this science [of human nature] is conversant
being the thoughts, feelings, and actions of human beings, it would
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have attained the ideal perfection of a science if it enabled us to foretell
how an individual would think, feel, or act, throughout life, with the
same certainty with which astronomy enables us to predict the places
and occultations of the heavenly bodies. It needs scarcely be stated that
nothing approaching to this can be done. (Mill, 2006b, p. 846)
And he concluded that methodological individualism is impossible even under ideal
conditions.
Hence, even if our science of human nature were theoretically perfect,
that is, if we could calculate any character as we can calculate the orbit
of any planet, from given data; still, as the data are never all given, nor
ever precisely alike in different cases, we could neither make positive
predictions, nor lay down universal propositions. (Mill, 2006b, p. 847),
original emphasis
Let us refer to these two arguments as Mill’s Impossibility Proposition (cf. Rizvi,
1997, pp. 281-283). There seems, though, to be a way around this difficulty.
Inasmuch, however, as many of those effects which it is of most im-
portance to render amendable to human foresight and control are de-
termined, like the tides, in an incomparably greater degree by general
causes, than by all partial causes taken together; depending in the main
on those circumstances and qualities which are common to all mankind,
or at least to large bodies of them, and only in a small degree on the
idiosyncrasies of organization or the peculiar history of individuals; it
is evidently possible with regard to all such effects, to make predictions
which will almost always be verified, and general propositions which
are almost always true. (Mill, 2006b, p. 847), original emphasis
With this, J. S. Mill defined a niche for economics as ‘inexact and separate sci-
ence’ (Hausman, 1992), (Hands, 2001, pp. 14-25). That is to say, he shifted the
demarcation line somewhat in favor of economics. It took some time until standard
economics rediscovered Mill’s insights with Arrow’s Richard T. Ely lecture about
the problems of methodological individualism in 1994 (Arrow, 1994).
4 Jevons: Here are the behavioral laws
The science of Economics, however, is in some degree peculiar, owing
to the fact ... that its ultimate laws are known to us immediately by
intuition, or, at any rate, they are furnished to us ready made by other
mental or physical sciences. That every person will choose the greater
apparent good; that human wants are more or less quickly satiated;
that prolonged labor becomes more and more painful; are a few of
the simple inductions on which we can proceed to reason deductively
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with great confidence. From these axioms we can deduce the laws of
supply and demand, the laws of that difficult conception, value, and all
the intricate results of commerce, so far as data are available. (Jevons,
1911, p. 18)
The priority was to elaborate the theory. The data were expected to come in due
course.
I do not hesitate to say, too, that Economics might be gradually erected
into an exact science, if only commercial statistics were far more
complete and accurate than they are at present, so that the formulæ
could be endowed with exact meaning by the aid of numerical data.
(Jevons, 1911, p. 21)
And from this clearly follows:
I contend that all economic writers must be mathematical so far as
they are scientific at all, because they treat of economic quantities, . . .
(Jevons, 1911, p. xxi)
Jevons developed the calculus of pleasure and pain. That is, circumventing psychol-
ogism as well as numerical data, he cut introspection and mathematics short.
The axioms that are used to define “rationality” are based on the in-
trospection of economists and not on the observed behaviour of indi-
viduals. Economists from Pareto through Hicks to Koopmans have
long made this point. Thus we have wound up in the weird position
of developing models that unjustifiably claim to be scientific because
they are based on the idea that the economy behaves like a rational
individual, when behavioural economics provides a wealth of evidence
showing that the rationality in question has little or nothing to do with
how people behave. (Kirman, 2009, p. 81)
5 The art of borrowing
In the era of political economy economists actively participated in the grand project
of the advance of knowledge.
I am inclined to say even more: from Plato to Descartes, Leibniz, Kant,
Duhem and Poincaré; and from Bacon, Hobbes, and Locke, to Hume,
Mill, and Russel, the theory of knowledge was inspired by the hope that
it would enable us not only to know more about knowledge, but also to
contribute to the advance of knowledge – of scientific knowledge, that
is. (Popper, 1980, p. 19)
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It was rather commonplace that a physicist, e.g. Mach, or a mathematician, e.g.
Poincaré, quoted J. S. Mill on matters of methodology (Mach, 1898, p. 230),
(Poincaré, 2007, p. 151).
Mill expressly advocated borrowing from the exact sciences. This, however,
involved two essentially different elements. First, the idea of causal laws.
The backward state of the Moral Sciences can only be remedied by
applying to them the methods of Physical Science, duly extended and
generalized. (Mill, 2006b, p. 833)
Second, the deductive method.
In the definition which we have attempted to frame of the science of
Political Economy, we have characterized it as essentially an abstract
science, and its method as the method à priori. Such is undoubtedly
its character as it has been understood and taught by all its most dis-
tinguished teachers. It reasons, and, as we contend, must necessarily
reason, from assumptions, not from facts. It is built upon hypotheses,
strictly analogous to those which, under the name of definitions, are the
foundations of other abstract sciences. (?, p. 110), original emphasis
Mill was quite explicit about the subsidiary role of the deductive method.
The ground of confidence in any concrete deductive science is not the
à priori reasoning itself, but the accordance between its results and
those of observation à posteriori. (Mill, 2006b, p. 896-897), original
emphasis
And without undue delay he stated the fundamental behavioral principle.
Just in the same manner [as geometry] does Political Economy pre-
suppose an arbitrary definition of man, as a being who invariably does
that by which he may obtain the greatest amount of necessaries, conve-
niences, and luxuries, with the smallest quantity of labour and physical
self-denial with which they can be obtained in the existing state of
knowledge. (?, p. 110)
With this Mill got rid of psychologism, yet he never claimed that he had formulated
a universal behavioral law.
In political economy for instance, empirical laws of human nature
are tacitly assumed by English thinkers, which are calculated only for
Great Britain and the United States. (Mill, 2006b, p. 906)
Jevons, too, borrowed from physics.
The Theory of Economy thus treated presents a close analogy to the
Science of Statistical Mechanics . . . (Jevons, 1911, p. vii)
14
His program was from outer appearances the same as Mill’s but Jevons went one
decisive step further.
An explicit maximization hypothesis has been the hallmark of neoclas-
sical economic since the end of the nineteenth century and might easily
be seen to be the one major departure that distinguishes neoclassical
from classical economics. (Boland, 2003, p. 49)
This established marginalism as the explanatory device from consumer choice to
production and distribution.
By the time a sophisticated logical system is build up, it is no longer
easy to relax [the] originally instrumental but now ontological assump-
tions on a one-by-one basis, because the relaxed assumptions (even
those of a more realist kind), still have to be blended into the rest of the
system in order to derive new theorems. This, the system can hardly
escape being contaminated by the unreal ontology unwittingly formed
in the rest of the system, an ontology that no longer has any conceivable
counterpart in reality .... (Woo, 1992, p. 37), original emphasis
While J. S. Mill was on equal terms with the physicists and mathematicians of his
day, Jevons did not enjoy the same acceptance.
None of of these scientist-critics aimed to deny the legitimacy of theory,
not even in political economy. Nor did they commonly denounce
a premature use of mathematics. They objected, rather, to “loose”
theorizing. (Porter, 1994, p. 130)
Generally there is nothing wrong with borrowing, only with look-alike copying.
Successful imitation is anything but straightforward. The most indis-
criminate copying will not suffice to create a perfect correspondence.
What begins as imitation, if it succeeds, must inevitable take a life of
its own. (Porter, 1994, pp. 128-129)
Sometimes, however, the look-alike looks more authentic than the original.
. . . science’s evaluatory procedures for assessing knowledge claims . . .
although generally reliable, are fallible. Sometimes false claims are
admitted. (Suppe, 1977, p. 725)
6 Popper: The defense of the indefensible
Profound truths are not to be expected of methodology. (Popper, 1980,
p. 54)
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Popper declared situational analysis to be a generalization of the method of economic
analysis, i.e. the concept of rational choice as inaugurated by Jevons (Blaug, 1994,
p. 112).
In my view, the idea of a social situation is the fundamental category
of the methodology of the social sciences. (Popper, 1994, p. 166),
original emphasis
This entailed a demarcation against psychologism.
. . . I propose to treat both . . . aims and knowledge not as psychological
facts, to be ascertained by psychological methods, but as elements of
the objective social situation. (Popper, 1994, p. 167), original emphasis
So first of all, the whole bunch of soap-opera explanations had to be replaced by
one principle.
. . . it is the central point of situational analysis that we need, in order
to ‘animate’ it, no more than the assumption that the various persons
or agents involved act adequately, or appropriately – that is to say, in
accordance with the situation. . . . Thus there is only one animating law
involved . . . It is known in the literature under the name of ‘rationality
principle’, . . . (Popper, 1994, p. 169)
Unfortunately, as Popper did not fail to notice, this principle does not hold water.
But a principle that is not universally true is false. Thus the rationality
principle is false. I think there is no way out of this. . . . Now if the
rationality principle is false, then an explanation that consists of the
conjunction of this principle and a model must also be false, even if the
particular model is true. (Popper, 1994, pp. 172)
It seems that we have nothing gained with this move.
If we wish nevertheless to uphold the method of situational analysis as
the proper method of the social sciences, as I certainly do, and if we
wish to uphold the view that science searches for truth, are we not in a
hopelessly difficult position? (Popper, 1994, p. 173), original emphasis
Yes, indeed, if one contradicts one’s most important criterion of demarcation.
. . . if one maintains the fundamentally individualistic approach to
constructing economic models no amount of attention to the walls
will prevent the citadel from being empty. Empty in the sense that one
cannot expect it to house the elements of a scientific theory, one capable
of producing empirically falsifiable propositions. (Kirman, 1989, p.
126)
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7 Keynes: The return of common sense
Life is short. Nature is niggardly. Our fellows have other objectives.
(Robbins, 1935, p. 13)
There has always been a third kind of truth. To make the world we live in under-
standable to ourselves we have not only myth and science but also common sense –
uneasily sitting between the two. J. S. Mill had no friendly word for common sense.
People fancied they saw the sun rise and set, the stars revolve in circles
round the pole. We now know that they saw no such thing; what they
really saw was a set of appearances, equally reconcileable with the
theory they held and with a totally different one. It seems strange
that such an instance as this, . . . , should not have opened the eyes of
the bigots of common sense, and inspired them with a more modest
distrust of the competency of mere ignorance to judge the conclusions
of cultivated thought. (Mill, 2006b, p. 783), original emphasis
Apart from being presumptuous, common sense is simply not up to the task.
But, as beings of limited experience, we must always and necessarily
have limited conceptive powers; while it does not by any means follow
that the same limitations obtain in the possibilities of nature, nor even
in her actual manifestations. (Mill, 2006b, p. 753)
Keynes thought otherwise (Coates, 2007, pp. 8-11). He was acquainted with Quine’s
argument that theoretical simplification is achieved through formalization but held
that this did not apply to the social realm.
Between the alternatives of metaphorical jouissance and an austere
canonical notation there is a middle route, and its viability has been
argued for, and displayed by Keynes. (Coates, 2007, p. 87), original
emphasis
Before starting work on the General Theory, Keynes had made up his mind.
In the early thirties he confessed to Roy Harrod that he was “returning
to an age-long tradition of common sense.” (Coates, 2007, p. 11)
Now, economics deals not only with individuals and social relations but the eco-
nomic system as a whole and Keynes had to come to grips with ‘definitions and
ideas’. In fact, he did not. He spent an immense amount of his time on Book II ‘and
still left his successors in confusion’ (Moggridge, 1976, p. 33).
By choosing definitions on the ground that they correspond with actual
usage Keynes was formulating an ordinary language social science,
one that bears a resemblance to those argued for by philosophers of
hermeneutics. (Coates, 2007, p. 90)
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To recall, Newton first defined his basic concepts mass and force by giving them a
precise meaning that was quite different from the woolly everyday usage. In marked
contrast, Keynes related his definition of income expressly to ‘the practices of the
Income Tax Commissioners’. He was in grave doubt whether “it might be better
to employ the term windfalls for what I call profits”. But he was quite sure that
“saving and investment are, necessarily and by definition, equal – which after all, is
in full harmony with common sense and the common usage of the world.” (Keynes,
quoted in Coates, 2007, pp. 93, 91, original emphasis)
Keynes had no clear idea of the fundamental economic concepts income and
profit, and he knew it.
His Collected Writings show that he wrestled to solve the Profit Puzzle
up till the semi-final versions of his GT but in the end he gave up and
discarded the draft chapter dealing with it. (Tómasson and Bezemer,
2010, pp. 12-13, 16)
In the discussions following the publication of the General Theory Keynes had ‘no
desire’ that the particular forms of his ‘comparatively simple fundamental ideas . . .
should be crystallized at the present state of the debate’ (cited in Rotheim, 1981,
p. 571). Keynes kept the discussion within the compass of common sense, where
‘nothing is clear and everything is possible’ (Keynes, 1973, p. 292). And there it
remained, with a whole generation of economists guessing ‘what Keynes really
meant.’
With his middle route Keynes followed the philosophically well-established
Cambridge tradition of loose verbal reasoning.
Another danger is that you may ‘precise everything away’ and be left
with only a comparative poverty of meaning. . . . Such a problem
was avoided, said Keynes, by Marshall who used loose definitions but
allowed the reader to infer his meaning from “the richness of context.”
(Coates, 2007, p. 87), see also (Hoover, 1998, p. 243), (Colander, 1995,
p. 283), (Harcourt, 1995, pp. 67-69, 207)
But, again, common sense, legitimized by its descent from the Scottish School of
common sense and euphemized as vigilant observation and intuition, was not up to
the task.
Looking back over the last 70 years it is an inescapable fact that the
theoretical arm of the Keynesian Revolution never got off the ground.
(Rogers, 2010, p. 152)
The Cambridge tradition, continual frustration notwithstanding, still has its episte-
mological adherents.
For Keynes as for Post Keynesians the guiding motto is "it is better to
be roughly right than precisely wrong!" (Davidson, 1984, p. 574)
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If we define the ambition of science as to get it precisely right (or else to keep a
low profile), then the guiding motto of Post Keynesianism amounts to an invitation
of ‘Babylonian incoherent babble’ (cf. Dow, 2005, p. 385) and leads, predictably,
to a loss of theoretical coherence (King, 2002, pp. 203-208). Confronted with
the phony alternative relevance vs. rigor or truth vs. precision (Mayer, 1993) the
non-Keynesians opted for rigor.
Mathematical economics, it seems, had the great virtue of demonstra-
ble irrelevance, which was morally preferable to spurious relevance.
(Porter, 1994, p. 155)
Since Keynes’s days common sense came steadily more under pressure with the
escalation of weirdness in the natural sciences and mathematics.
. . . the fundamental problem in philosophy of science – making sense
of and determining how science has arrived in a justified way at its
present, extremely weird, beliefs about how the world is. . . . Thales
and Aristotele could not have arrived at quantum theory; no naive
examination of experience could have suggested such a view of the
world. (Suppe, 1977, p. 684), original emphasis
This opened a welcome chance to defend all kinds of weird concepts with fresh
panache. Had not Newton introduced the occult force of gravitation, and had not
Galileo assumed a nonexistent vacuum? This became the first line of defense against
the critique of unrealism in economics.
The most important methodological issue in economics has been and
persists to be over what is called the ‘realism’ of theories and their ‘as-
sumptions’. Profit maximization, perfect information, transitive prefer-
ences, diminishing returns, rational expectations, perfectly competitive
markets, givenness of tastes, technology and institutional framework,
non-gendered agents – these and many other ideas have been assumed
by some economists and questioned by others. (Mäki, 1994, p. 236)
There are, though, two kinds of weirdness: justified and unjustified. The first
thing to notice is that physical weirdness occurs on very small or very large scales
(Feynman, 1992, p. 127). Second, Newton could not, in the strict sense, explain
gravitation but he could express it in a neat formula. The calculations that were
performed with it proved to be quite accurately in correspondence with facts.
The second line of defense appeals rhetorically to common sense.
But can the model be true? Can any model be true? I do not think so.
Any model, whether in physics or in the social sciences, must be be an
over-simplification. (Popper, 1994, p. 172)
Indeed, who could ever deny this truism? The map is not the landscape. The point
is that Newton knew how to properly over-simplify (Cohen, 1999, pp. 148-155) and
thereby to gain real insights while his imitators in the social sciences did not.
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In economics the conceptual primitives are humans, middle-sized objects, mea-
surable variables like prices, and in most cases trivial events like buying and selling
which involve rather down-to-earth human faculties. That is, the economic realm
is coextensive with the physical realm that has been satisfactorily explained by
classical mechanics. Physics has to be taken seriously as a boundary condition.
Political Economy, therefore, presupposes all the physical sciences; it
takes for granted all such of the truths of those sciences as are concerned
in the production of the objects demanded by the wants of mankind; . . .
(Mill, 2004, p. 102)
Yet classical mechanics is not weird at all. It is alone economic theory that is weird,
as Walras learned to his chagrin.
Walras approached Poincaré for his approval. . . . But Poincaré was
devoutly committed to applied mathematics and did not fail to notice
that utility is a nonmeasurable magnitude. . . . He also wondered about
the premises of Walras’s mathematics: It might be reasonable, as a
first approximation, to regard men as completely self-interested, but
the assumption of perfect foreknowledge “perhaps requires a certain
reserve.” (Porter, 1994, p. 154), see also (Hoover, 1995, p. 40)
By the same token is Keynes’s uncertainty argument perfectly justified.
The sense in which I am using the term [uncertainty] is that in which
the prospect of a European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and
the rate of interest twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of a new
invention . . . About these matters there is no scientific basis on which
to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know.
(Keynes, 1937, p. 214), see also (Davidson, 2012)
Economists seem to be irresistibly attracted by insolvable puzzles. The solutions
then consist regularly of a petitio principii (Mill, 2006b, p. 820), that is, the result,
e.g. simultaneous equilibrium, is prefigured in the premises, e.g. perfect competition,
diminishing returns etc., and then logically derived. Since simultaneous equilibrium
is a nonentity the premises cannot be other than weird.
Mankind in all ages have had a strong propensity to conclude that
wherever there is a name, there must be a distinguishable separate
entity corresponding to the name; . . . (Mill, 2006b, p. 756)
Compared to the weirdness of assumptions like foreknowledge Keynes’s return to
justified common sense must therefore be counted as theoretical progress, notwith-
standing the fact that it brings us only back to from where Socrates started, i.e. to ‘I
know that I know nothing.’
The problem is . . . that the assumptions made in economic theories
and models simply are unrealistic in the wrong way and for the wrong
reasons. (Pålsson Syll, 2010, p. 26)
20
Physicists do not reject unrealistic abstractions and idealizations as long as they do
not distort the object of inquiry beyond recognition, yet there is perfect unanimity
that, for example, an ideal construct like a perpetual motion machine is impossible
in principle and not merely infeasible in practice, which means, no entity is ‘cor-
responding to the name.’ Let us call this the Physicist’s Nonentity Proposition. It
is, clearly, a conversation-stopper. What Keynes called the ‘classical’ theory is the
economic counterpart of a perpetual motion machine. To spell this out made the
General Theory a conversation-stopper. And it still is. Keynes’s scientific stance is
consensus among methodologists.
A scientific theory cannot require the facts to conform to its own
assumptions. (Keynes, 1973, p. 276)
This is in full accordance with the classical stance.
Such thinkers do not reflect that the idea, being a result of abstraction,
ought to conform to the facts, and cannot make the facts conform to it.
(Mill, 2006b, p. 751)
Most important, this stance marked the demarcation line between the modern
scientist and the ‘stuffed shirts of the peripatetic school‘ (Koestler, 1979, p. 363).
These savants, as Galileo put it, first decided how the world should
function in accordance with their preconceived principles. . . . He
openly criticized scientist and philosophers who accepted laws which
conformed to their preconceived ideas as to how nature must behave.
Nature did not first make men’s brains, he said, and then arrange the
world so that it would be acceptable to human intellects. (Kline, 1982,
p. 48)
A rather obvious example for the peripatetic stance of the orthodoxy is behavioral
marginalism. A profit maximum exists only with decreasing returns. Whether
returns decrease or increase is an empirical question and we may well find out
that decreasing, constant, and increasing returns are randomly distributed among
the firms in an economy. However, if one is determined to apply calculus one is
forced to ‘arrange the world’ and to take refuge in a weird well-behaved production
function, blithely ignoring the fact that it is a nonentity (Hudson, 2010, p. 11).
Realism led Keynes to the conclusion that the ‘classics’, i.e. the British neoclas-
sical school, stood on the wrong side of the demarcation line but in contradistinction
to Galileo he could not offer an in all respects superior alternative. Ultimately, a
common sense statement is a hypothesis that may be true or false or undecidable
like any scientific hypothesis. Therefore common sense needs justification and
cannot claim to be an independent and direct source of knowledge. Nonetheless,
the appeal to common sense makes a good argument in the political arena. Hence
‘telling a plausible story’ (Harcourt, 1995, p. 207) was Keynes’s uppermost priority.
21
I consider that Keynes had no real grasp of formal economic theorizing
(and also disliked it), and that he consequently left many gaping holes
in his theory. I none the less hold that his insights were several orders
more profound and realistic than those of his recent critics. (Hahn,
1982, pp. x-xi)
With regard to weird behavioral assumptions common sense points the way to the
right side of the demarcation line. To follow it, however, is beyond common sense.
. . . Keynes, too, sometimes gave the impression of not having fully
grasped the logic of his own system. (Laidler, 1999, p. 281)
Keynes famously announced his revolution with a reference to Euclid.
Yet, in truth, there is no remedy except to throw over the axiom of
parallels and to work out a non-Euclidean geometry. Something similar
is required to-day in economics. (Keynes, 1973, p. 16)
This in turn would have required some sort of non-Euclidean axioms, that is, a bit
more formalization than Keynes was prepared to do himself.
I mean by this that formalization eliminates provincial and inessential
features of the way in which a scientific theory has been thought about.
. . . Formalization is a way of setting off from the forest of implicit
assumptions and the surrounding thickness of confusion, the ground
that is required for the theory being considered. . . . In areas of science
where great controversy exists about even the most elementary concepts,
the value of such formalization can be substantial. (Suppes, 1968, pp.
654-655)
8 Lawson: Heterodox disarray
The main ‘culprit’, I shall argue is a mode of explanation that can be
referred to as deductivist, or, more particularly, it is the conception of
‘laws’ (or ‘significant results’ or ‘theoretical formulations’) upon which
deductivist explanation ultimately depends. (Lawson, 1997, p. 16),
original emphasis
Is deductivist the same thing as deductive, i.e. ‘the process of reasoning from one
or more general statements . . . to reach a logically certain conclusion’ (Wikipedia:
Deductive reasoning)? Obviously not.
By deductivism I simply mean the collection of theories . . . that is
erected upon the event regularity conception of laws . . . . (Lawson,
1997, p. 17)
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Now, the conception of a law implies a deterministic event regularity in the causal
form ‘if event X then event Y.’ This, though, is quite different from the deductive
form which states ‘if antecedent X then consequent Y.’ This form has nothing to do
with deterministic causal laws.
. . . deductive chains of reasoning cannot on their own establish the
existence of causal processes in the real world. (Hodgson, 2001, p. 76),
see also (Westfall, 2008, pp. 422, 645)
Yet the two are closely interrelated in physics.
To give a causal explanation of an event means to deduce a statement
which describes it, using as premises of the deduction one or more
universal laws, together with certain singular statements, the initial
conditions. (Popper, 1980, p. 59), original emphasis
The key point is that universal laws are taken as premises. Deduction is applied
in physics too, but physic’s hallmark are deterministic laws while mathematics is
purely deductive.
It is a well-known jest that ‘a mathematician is a scientist who knows
neither what he is talking about nor whether whatever he is talking
about exists or not’. (Cartan, quoted in Ronan, 2006, p. 70)
Nobody has ever criticized mathematicians for being “deductivist”. Quite the
contrary, the plain fact that products of pure deductive reasoning correspond in
numerous cases admirably to the objects and processes of reality has puzzled
physicists, philosophers, and the mathematicians themselves since the ancient
Greeks (Wigner, 1979), (Kline, 1982, pp. 328-354), (Feynman, 1992, p. 171),
(Velupillai, 2005), (Penrose, 2007, pp. 613-614).
It is the idea of an event regularity in the form of a law that has been identified
by Lawson as main culprit. Hence “determinist” instead of “deductivist” would have
been a less ambiguous characteristics. The deductive method does not necessarily
imply deterministic laws that enable prediction in the social realm. This is known
since J. S. Mill.
It is evident, in the first place, that Sociology, considered as a system
of deductions à priori, cannot be a science of positive predictions, but
only of tendencies. (Mill, 2006b, p. 898)
Positive prediction would only be possible if the premises were universal determin-
istic laws.
If the conditions of the theory are satisfied, the events that it predicts
will necessarily take place. This inevitability of the analysis accords it
a considerable prognostic significance, according to Robbins. Seldom
has a simple view of a matter found so much support as the apriorism
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that he professed, which John Stuart Mill . . . developed for the first time
under the name ‘concrete deduction’ as a variant of the hypothetico-
deductive model of physics. (Klant, 1994, p. 25)
Yet Mill’s idea of the deductive method was quite different.
The simplest supposition which accords with any of the most obvious
facts, is the best to begin with; because its consequences are the most
easily traced. This rude hypothesis is then rudely corrected, and the
operation repeated; and the comparison of the consequences deducible
from the corrected hypothesis, with the observed facts, suggests still
further correction, until the deductive results are at last made to tally
with the phenomena. (Mill, 2006b, pp. 496-497)
The salient point is easy to see. Robbins presupposed the existence of universal
deterministic behavioral laws. This, evidently, has nothing to do with the deduc-
tive method. What Lawson criticizes under the label “deductivist” is Robbins’s
misapplication. At first it seems that Lawson got the point.
Certainly, any application of the retroductive . . . form of reasoning
requires an explicit prior statement of the premises which are used to
initiate the analysis. Nor, of course, is deduction per se ruled out in the
latter, or in any other general approach to reasoning. (Lawson, 1997, p.
112)
But in the next sentence he equates “deductivist” with what in fact is “determinist”.
The employment of deductive logic, where it is appropriate, is not
accepting the deductivist form of analysis (whereby the object always
is to deduce specific claims about actualities from accepted ‘laws’
and initial conditions, possibly including its axioms and assumptions).
(Lawson, 1997, p. 112)
This means in more concrete terms.
The essence of neoclassical economic theory is its exclusive use of a de-
ductivist Euclidean methodology. A methodology – which Arnsperger
& Varoufakis calls the neoclassical meta-axioms of “methodological
individualism, methodological instrumentalism and methodological
equilibration” – that is more or less imposed as constituting economics,
and, usually, without a smack of argument. (Pålsson Syll, 2010, p. 24)
We are no longer occupied with the deductive method pure and simple as conceived
by Mill. So this is what is at issue: (a) the deductive method is mistaken, or
(b), there is nothing wrong with the method but the neoclassical meta-axioms and
deterministic behavioral laws are beside the point.
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And here is where the flimsy logic of the critics of the neoclassical approach
comes in. From the widely accepted premise that neoclassical economics is un-
satisfactory and the correct observation that it applies the deductive method and
produces an abundance of vacuous mathematical models the conclusion is drawn
that the method is wrong. The simple fact is – as already noticed by Poincaré – that
the foundational assumptions of neoclassical economics are inadmissible. Hence
the correct conclusion is to reject the meta-axioms and to keep hold of the deductive
method because it is neutral with regard to premises. With false premises it yields
the false conclusion and vice versa with true premises. It is as straightforward as
‘garbage in, garbage out’. What is needed are true premises.
Each theory (heterodox approaches are no exception) starts from ‘hypotheses or
axioms or postulates or assumptions or even principles’ (Schumpeter, 1994, p. 15).
Therefore, the crucial question is:
What are the propositions which may reasonably be received without
proof? That there must be some such propositions all are agreed, since
there cannot be an infinite series of proof, a chain suspended from
nothing. (Mill, 2006a, p. 746)
No theory whatever can dodge this question. Emphasizing that neoclassical eco-
nomics is unconvincing is neither new nor helpful. Mathematics as pure deduction
is not the problem either. It allows us to express the wrong idea that the planets
move in circles or the right idea that they move in ellipses. By the same token it
allows us to express the wrong idea that the economy is a deterministic equilib-
rium system and the right idea that it is a nondeterministic open system. That the
economy evolves is a heterodox tenet at least since Veblen (1961). But since 1898
the proponents of open systems methodology (Dow, 2006, pp. 139-143) could not
produce anything that resembles a theory.
The idea of the economy as an open, adapting and evolving system has
always been present, but the failure of this point of view to generate
any firm propositions about what one might expect to observe, and at
the same time its failure to construct any sort of axiomatic theoretical
framework led to its marginalization. (Kirman, 1997, p. 103)
This is not a question of formalization but of theoretical ingenuity. The first im-
portant point is to get around the peripatetic fallacy and to start with the right
foot.
The mathematical language used to formulate a theory is usually taken
for granted. However, it should be recognized that most of mathematics
used in physics was developed to meet the theoretical needs of physics.
The moral is that the symbolic calculus employed by a scientific theory
should be tailored to the theory, not the other way round. (Wittgenstein,
quoted in Schmiechen, 2009, p. 368), original emphasis
Now, take the mathematics away and what is left?
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To Plato’s question, “Granted that there are means of reasoning
from premises to conclusions, who has the privilege of choosing the
premises?” the correct answer, I presume, is that anyone has this privi-
lege who wishes to exercise it, but that everyone else has the privilege
of deciding for himself what significance to attach to the conclusions,
and that somewhere there lies the responsibility, through the choice of
the appropriate premises, to see to it that judgment, information, and
perhaps even faith, hope and charity, wield their due influence on the
nature of economic thought. (Viner, 1963, p. 12)
This is a fair appraisal of the deductive method. What could be the objections
against it? No methodologist ever maintained that it automatically produces ‘true’
theories. This may appear as a serious drawback, but neither exaggerated claims nor
disappointed expectations provide a valid argument against the method. Science is
a trial-and-error process and the deductive method does not provide a free lunch.
Methodology has commonly been seen as providing us with a rule book
for rational procedure to follow if it is to discover the way the world is,
. . . (Coates, 2007, p. 9)
Methodology is nothing of the sort; ‘science is not so simple that following a set of
ready-made rules will guarantee instant success’ (Redman, 1993, p. 86).
The gist of the whole matter is: by rightly sticking to the deductive method
yet applying indefensible premises neoclassical economics discredited the method
in the eyes of critics. This would be a minor casualty were it not for the fact that
by rejecting the method heterodoxy deprives itself of one of the most elementary
scientific tools to build up a serious theoretical alternative.
. . . we may say that the long-lasting success of our categories and the
omnipresence of a certain point of view is not a sign of excellence or an
indication that the truth or part of the truth has at last been found. It is,
rather, the indication of a failure of reason to find suitable alternatives
which might be used to transcend an accidental intermediate stage of
our knowledge. (Feyerabend, 2004, p. 72), original emphasis
9 Deduction vs. intuition: a phony trade-off
A purely deductive method would ensure us that conclusions were as
probative as the premises on which they build. But deduction is totally
unampliative. Its output is in its truth-transmitting input. If we are to
use content-increasing methods we therefore have to accept that they
can’t be of a deductive caliber. (Pålsson Syll, 2010, p. 48)
Indeed, but this is the very strength of the method and not a lamentable weakness.
Two points are essential: to state the premises explicitly and then to develop the
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logical implications without tacitly changing the premises on the way and without
introducing additional premises. If there is truth in the premises it is conserved,
nothing is added and nothing is lost. The method ensures formal consistency, not
more, not less.
Research is in fact a continuous discussion of the consistency of theo-
ries: formal consistency insofar as the discussion relates to the logical
cohesion of what is asserted in joint theories; material consistency
insofar as the agreement of observations with theories is concerned.
(Klant, 1994, p. 31)
Formal consistency, of course, is not all but it is a necessary condition ‘for he who
contradicts himself proves nothing’ (Klant, 1988, pp. 112-113).
By its very nature the deductive method must not be content-increasing. The
content resides in the premises. Hence the choice of premises is decisive. This
choice, though, is antecedent to the application of the deductive method. This is
long known from the history of science.
Popper demonstrates that “logic, whether deductive or inductive, cannot
possibly make the step from these theories [of Galileo and Kepler] to
Newton’s dynamics. It is only ingenuity which can make this step.”
(Cohen, 1977, p. 335)
In a similar way Einstein speaks of the ‘search for those highly universal
laws . . . from which a picture of the world can be obtained by pure
deduction. There is no logical path’, he says, ‘leading to these . . . laws.
They can only be reached by intuition, based upon something like an
intellectual love (‘Einfühlung’) of the objects of experience. (Popper,
1980, p. 32)
And yet, by three incorrect steps . . . , Kepler stumbled on the correct
law. It is perhaps the most amazing sleepwalking performance in the
history of science . . . (Koestler, 1979, p. 333)
The pivot of any scientific inquiry is – once more:
What are the propositions which may reasonably be received without
proof? That there must be some such propositions all are agreed, since
there cannot be an infinite series of proof, a chain suspended from
nothing. But to determine what these propositions are, is the opus
magnum of the more recondite mental philosophy. (Mill, 2006a, p.
746), original emphasis
Deduction does not prevent intuition, it rather presupposes the opus magnum of
intuition (Whewell, 1989, p. 319).
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10 Refocusing the domain
In fact, the history of every science, including that of economics,
teaches us that the elementary is the hotbed of the errors that count
most. (Georgescu-Roegen, 1970, p. 9)
This brings us to the very question of what the elementary in the infinite multitude
of economic phenomena is.
Thus, economics is apparently the study of the economy, the study of
the coordination process, the study of the effects of scarcity, the science
of choice, and the study of human behavior. One possible conclusion
to draw from this lack of agreement is that the definition of economics
does not really matter. (Backhouse and Medema, 2009, p. 221)
The task of theoretical economics is to create a mental map of the whole economy
without firsthand experience.
And in the social sciences it is even more obvious than in the natural
sciences that we cannot see and observe our objects before we have
thought about them. For most of the objects of social science, if not
all of them, are abstract objects; they are theoretical constructions.
(Popper, 1960, p. 135), original emphasis
That is, one has to leap from commonplace economics which trades in easy to grasp
phenomena on a small scale to an extremely abstract set of foundational propositions
about the economy as a whole.
Since, therefore, it is vain to hope that truth can be arrived at, either
in Political Economy or in any other department of the social science,
while we look at the facts in the concrete, clothed in all the complexity
with which nature has surrounded them, and endeavor to elicit a general
law by a process of induction from a comparison of details; there
remains no other method than the à priori one, or that of “abstract
speculation.” (?, p. 113-114)
The set of basic propositions has to reduce the vast complexity of the real thing to
almost nothing. From this almost-nothingness the real world complexity then has to
be logically reconstructed.
In Mach’s view, facts, however complicated, are reconstructed by a
synthetic combination of idealizations. (Klant, 1994, p. 119)
The first task, then, is to clarify the domain of the inquiry which is neither well-
defined nor arbitrary.
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Scientific domains are characterized as a number if items of information
(putative facts, including, perhaps, accepted laws and theories) which
come to be associated together as a body of information having the fol-
lowing characteristics: the association is based on some well-grounded,
significant, relationship between the items of information which are
suggestive of deeper unities among the items; . . . (Suppe, 1977, p.
686), original emphasis
The clarifying of the domain involves a tentative decision of what to take in and what
to leave out. For example: the trajectories of a feather and a canon ball both belong
to the physical realm. Being too complex the physicists ignored the flying feather
and focused on the falling canon ball. In this manner most real world phenomena
drop out of the domain – at least for the time being. One has no guarantee that this
abstraction from supposedly insignificant phenomena will work or whether one gets
hold of the significant relationships. Here is where intuition and skill come in.
The more complicated the model and the greater the number of the
variables involved, the further it moves beyond our mental control,
which in social sciences is the only possible control. ... A “simple-
minded” model may after all be the more enlightening representation
of the economic process provided that the economist has developed his
skill to the point of being able to pick up a few but significant elements
from the multitude of cluttering facts. The choice of relevant facts is
the main problem of any science, as Poincaré and Bridgman insisted.
(Georgescu-Roegen, 1971, pp. 340-341)
In the social realm we are confronted with the problem of reflexivity, that is, with
humans trying to make sense with human brains of human behavior and this may
prove to be a ‘strange loop’ (Hofstadter, 1979, p. 21), see also (Soros, 2010, pp.
10-11).
. . . several other sciences have emerged . . . at a comparatively recent
date, none now remain . . . except those which relate to man himself,
the most complex and most difficult subject of study on which the
human mind can be engaged. (Mill, 2006b, p. 833)
For the purposes of economics the multi-dimensional Olympian personnel has been
reduced to the one-dimensional homo oeconomicus.
No science has been criticized by its own servants as openly and
constantly as economics. The motives of dissatisfaction are many,
but the most important pertains to the fiction of homo oeconomicus.
(Georgescu-Roegen, 1971, p. 1), original emphasis
Since homo oeconomicus is patently alien there was an almost instinctive call for
more realism. Commonsensical as it is, this conclusion jumps too short. The fact
that human beings belong to the economic realm does not automatically imply that
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they belong to the domain of economics or that they have to occupy a larger part of it.
In classical economics the main issues were accumulation, innovation, competition,
productivity, distribution of income and wealth etcetera. Homo oeconomicus was,
if anything, a side-show. The real humans belonged to the domains of psychology,
anthropology, sociology and biology.
It cannot be the intent of an economist who is on his way to understand how
the economy works to get lost in these domains. Insofar the reduction to homo
oeconomicus was justified. What is more, the prospects of rendering economics
more realistic by making homo oeconomicus more realistic are rather unpromising.
The human or personal factor will remain the irrational element in most,
or all, institutional social theories. (Popper, 1960, p. 157), original
emphasis
The quest for the laws of human behavior begins and ends, as the ancient Greeks
already realized, with a psychological account that is hardly ever distinguishable
from a projection. Therefore it was, in the first place, not such a good idea to put
theoretical economics on so weak a foundation.
The abstract idea of wealth or value in exchange . . . must be carefully
distinguished from accessory ideas of utility, scarcity and suitability to
the needs and enjoyment of mankind .... These ideas are variable, and
by nature indeterminate and consequently ill suited for the foundation
of a scientific theory .... (Cournot, quoted in Mirowski, 1995, p. 208),
see also (Ingrao and Israel, 1990, pp. 38, 41, 47, 81)
Let us call this Cournot’s Unfitness Proposition. It asserts that behavioral assump-
tions are incapable of supporting a sophisticated theoretical superstructure that
corresponds reasonably well with real world phenomena.2
Now, at any rate, we have an explanation for why the assumptions
of economic theory about individual action have not been improved,
corrected, sharpened, specified, or conditioned in ways that would
improve the predictive power of the theory. None of these things have
been done by economists because they cannot be done. (Rosenberg,
1992, p. 149)
And from this follows for the route to be taken:
2 Some classics grasped this intuitively: “Macaulay pointed out that asserting restrictive, unrealistic
assumptions about human nature and then deducing the whole science of politics was ridiculous.”
(Redman, 1997, p. 322). See also (Hudson, 2010, pp. 14-16). Modern physicists are perfectly aware
of the decisive methodological point: “By having a vague theory it is possible to get either result. . . .
It is usually said when this is pointed out, ‘When you are dealing with psychological matters things
can’t be defined so precisely’. Yes, but then you cannot claim to know anything about it.” (Feynman,
1992, p. 159)
30
The purpose . . . is to criticise the notion that economics is a science of
behaviour or that a science of behaviour is fundamental to economics.
This plausible and, as I believe, mistaken idea has sometimes been
called (methodological) psychologism, . . . . In opposition to psycholo-
gism I put forward the notion of economics as a study of spontaneous
order independent of any behavioural science. . . . If it is correct, then
all the attempts to derive an adequate model of economic behaviour
(as practised, for example, by the representatives of ‘behavioural’ or
‘psychological economics’) are misconceived. (Hudík, 2011, p. 147)
Let us call this Hudík’s Independence Proposition.
The critics of the neoclassical approach correctly spotted that the whole edifice
rests on a set of behavioral axioms (Hands, 2001, pp. 291-294).
There is in economics, or at least among the overwhelming majority
of its disciples, broad agreement as to what represents the corpus of
their subject. This corpus revolves around the concept of maximizing
behaviour, whether it be by the individual, firm or institution. (Blaug,
1990, p. 209)
Yet with the attempt to make the formal representation of choice more realistic the
critics actually confirm its implicit assumption which reads: in order to explain the
economy it is necessary to explain human behavior first.
If we ask, ‘What is the most adequate model of behaviour for eco-
nomics?’ we implicitly assume that economics actually needs a model
of behaviour; hence, we already assume psychologism of a kind.
(Hudík, 2011, p. 147)
It is rather obvious that one cannot understand the behavior of the economy by
speculating about the behavior of individuals. Therefore, one has to go one step
further and to move human behavior from the center of the domain to the periphery.
Put simply, we change the definition
Economics is the science which studies human behavior as a rela-
tionship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses.
(Robbins, 1935, p. 16)
to
Economics is the science which studies how the economic system
works.
This involves a shifting of the analytical starting point from the subjective to the
objective.
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. . . it is important to understand that what is put in question by re-
cent destructive results is not formalization in general but rather the
particular formalization generally employed in economic theory. That
a paradigm should be shown to be deficient does not imply that one
should cease to search for a paradigm. (Kirman, 1997, p. 97)
11 The real pros and the apparent cons of axiomatization
I believe that it is quite possible to axiomatize economics. (Morgen-
stern, quoted in Ingrao and Israel, 1990, p. 193)
Axioms are anathema among the critics of orthodoxy, unfortunately for the wrong
reasons.
Then there are axioms (everyone maximizes his profits; resource allo-
cation is the only economic problem): these are not known in other
sciences. An axiom . . . is only a premise one is not allowed to ques-
tion, dressed up as something grand. But it is precisely the scientists
duty to question everything! Our crime is not that we use a priori
reasoning, for often we can use nothing else, but that we push the a
priori all the way up to the axiom. "Axiom" is, of course, a polite
but impressive-sounding word for a "sacred proposition." The concept
gives us the impression that it is worthwhile to erect vast superstruc-
tures of deduction on virtually no fact, and this has now become a
deep-rooted tradition. . . . These, then (abstractions, parsimony, ax-
ioms, economic determinacy) surely are the "Ricardian Vices" to which
we are all heirs; it is these that divert and corrupt our energies. (Wiles,
1979, pp. 163-164), original emphasis
This critique does not apply generally because, as we have seen, Cournot’s Unfitness
Proposition excludes a priori the assumption that everyone maximizes his profits
from becoming an axiom. In point of fact, it excludes any behavioral assumption.
The critique has been led astray by neoclassical practice. Ignoring this detour, the
rationale for an axiomatic approach is rather straightforward.
A formal approach gives the opportunity to make assumptions explicit
and to prove results which may previously have been perceived intu-
itively, or even to deduce conclusions from self-evident truths. These
results can then be communicated unambiguously, because they are
obtained within a system of agreed rules. There can only be disagree-
ment about the assumptions or the chosen method itself. (Chick, 1998,
p. 1867)
This is the proper understanding of axiomatization since the classics.
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To Senior belongs the signal honor of having been the first to make
the attempt to state, consciously and explicitly, the postulates that are
necessary and sufficient in order to build up . . . that little analytic
apparatus commonly known as economic theory, or to put it differently,
to provide for it an axiomatic basis. (Schumpeter, 1994, p. 575), see
also (Stigum, 1991, p. 4), (Rosenberg, 1992, pp. 239-248)
Axiomatization has become, again, a serious issue in economics since Wald, von
Neumann, McKenzie, Debreu, Arrow and Hahn (Mirowski, 2002, pp. 104-113,
303, 408-409), (Weintraub, 1998), (Leonhard, 1995, pp. 755-756). It is supposed
to guarantee the coherence and consistency of all parts of a theoretical edifice.
Axiomatization per se, however, leads merely to ‘rigorous rubbish’ (Clower, 1994,
p. 409) if the domain is not accurately identified. Hence axiomatization is a
necessary but not a sufficient condition for any theoretical approach concerned with
the complex real and nominal interdependencies of the evolving economic system
and their eventual outcomes. Keynes, we know, was not enthusiastic of anything
more formal than ordinary language.
Formalization of even a part of what goes into our common sense
understanding of society would be, as he [Keynes] said “prolix and
complicated to the point of obscurity.” (Coates, 2007, p. 8)
This may even be correct with regard to the understanding of society but does not
apply to the description of the economic system. Keynes echoes the perennial
critique of formalism and reinforces a widespread misunderstanding.
. . . ‘formalism’ is not the same thing as ‘formalization’ or ‘mathematiza-
tion’ because it is possible to express a theory mathematically and even
axiomatically without necessarily degenerating into ‘formalism’, which
simply means giving top priority to the formal structure of modelling
irrespective of its content; . . . (Blaug, 1994, p. 131)
The formalism-formalization debate has been fought among the physicists . . .
Mathematicians are only dealing with the structure of reasoning, and
they do not really care what they are talking about. ... You state the
axioms, such-and-such is so, and such-and-such is so. What then?
The logic can be carried out without knowing what such-and-such
words mean. ... But the physicist has meaning to all his phrases. That
is a very important thing that people who come to physics by way
of mathematics do not appreciate. Physics is not mathematics, and
mathematics is not physics. One helps the other. But in physics you
have to have an understanding of the connection of words with the real
world. It is necessary at the end to translate what you have figured out
into English, into the world. (Feynman, quoted in Clower, 1995, p.
308-309), see also (McCloskey, 1991)
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. . . and among the mathematicians themselves. Hilbert’s program of the axiomatiza-
tion of mathematics did not go unchallenged. As a matter of fact, the mathematicians
had a fierce Methodenstreit of their own.
Brower blasted away the formalists. Of course, he said, axiomatic,
formalistic treatment may avoid contradictions, but nothing of mathe-
matical value will be obtained in this way. “An incorrect theory, even
if it cannot be rejected by any contradiction that would refute it, is
nevertheless incorrect, just as a criminal act in nonetheless criminal
whether or not any court could prevent it.” ... “To the question, where
shall mathematical rigor be found, the two parties give different an-
swers. The intuitionist says, in the human intellect; the formalist says,
on paper.” (Kline, 1982, pp. 252-253)
Hilbert’s formalism consisted in cutting the semantic connection between mathe-
matical concepts and real world interpretations (Kline, 1982, p. 193). Formalism is
entirely self-contained and some mathematicians were not prepared to go this far.
... Poincaré, the most outstanding mathematician at the turn of the
twentieth century, while acknowledging the value of axiomatic systems,
rejected Hilbert’s formalism. Similarly Frege, the leading logician of
the period, while rejecting Hilbert’s formalism, extensively used the
AA [Axiomatic Approach]. (Boylan and O’Gorman, 2007, p. 432)
The AA-variant of formalization maintains the reference to distinct real world
phenomena. It is therefore not liable to the charge of formalism. In marked contrast,
Debreu expressly committed himself to the ‘contemporary formalist school of
mathematics’ (Debreu, 1959, p. x). This difference is of some importance.
Formal axiomatic systems must be interpreted in some domain . . . to
become an empirical science. (Boylan and O’Gorman, 1995, p. 198),
see also (Koopmans, 1957, p. 173)
By consequence, when we talk of formalization the AA-variant is meant.
. . . Suppes sees formalization as having the following pay-offs: (1)
formalizing a connected family of concepts is one way to bring out
their meaning in an explicit fashion; (2) formalization results in the
standardization of terminology and the methods of conceptual anal-
ysis for various branches of science; (3) the generality provided by
formalization enables us to determine the essential features of theories;
(4) formalization provides a degree of objectivity which is impossible
without formalization; (5) formalization makes clear exactly what is
being assumed, and thus is a safeguard against ad hoc and post hoc
verbalizations; (6) formalization enables one to determine what the
minimal assumptions are which a theory requires. (Cohen, 1977, p.
111-112)
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What is demanded in economics according to Hudík’s Independence Proposition is
the reconstruction of a coherent theoretical superstructure on a minimalist nonbe-
havioral foundation. When the market economy is conceived as a complex mesh
of structural and behavioral interdependencies then the probability of eventually
finding some strong regularity is greater on the structural than on the behavioral side
(Boylan and O’Gorman, 1995, p. 203). Behavior can initially be taken as random
until something more specific is known. There is a sizeable a priori probability that
the beneficial operations of the invisible hand will have the character of structural
interdependencies, which of course are not apparent to the naked eye but have to
be abstracted from readily accessible phenomena on the surface. This analytical
venture requires a unique coordinate system of primitive concepts to start with. This
framework of concepts has to be formalized by a set of axioms.
The adequate response to inadequate economic theories is not to aban-
don the attempt to be rigorous. (Backhouse, 2010, p. 186)
The longstanding quarrel about excessive formalization in economics therefore boils
down to the ‘trite injunction’ (Baumol) that powerful tools should be applied with a
sense of proportion.
As a personal matter, I have long believed that in dealing with M[odel]-
Worlds, axiomatization is useful as well as safe ... and I have not
changed my mind, even though my faith in formalization has been
sorely tested .... My opinion continues to be that axiomatics, like every
other tool of science, is no better than its user, and not all users are
skilled. (Clower, 1995, p. 308)
12 Axioms: The stuff theoretical economics is made of
Keynes always believed that ‘a little clear thinking’ or ’more lucidity’
could solve almost any problem. (Moggridge, 1976, p. 39)
During five years, Humphrey saw Newton laugh only once. He had
loaned an acquaintance a copy of Euclid. The acquaintance asked what
use its study would be to him. “Upon which Sir Isaac was very merry.”
(Westfall, 2008, p. 192)
Keynes, as we have seen, relied on the ordinary language concepts of income and
profit, with the effect that their relation remained ill-understood.
This [profit] is a subject to which economists have addressed themselves
for at least two hundred years, but without much success. For there is
at the moment no general theory of profits which commands anything
approaching universal acceptance either among academic economists
or among men of affairs. (Wood, 1975, p. i)
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Since profit is the pivotal phenomenon of the market system it should be evident
that a perfectly clear understanding of income and profit is the precondition for the
analysis of how the real world economy works.
The first three structural axioms relate to income, production, and expenditures
in a period of arbitrary length. Here the period length is conveniently assumed to be
the calendar year. Simplicity demands that we have at first one world economy, one
firm, and one product (for the geometrical exposition of the axiom set see 2012a).
Total income of the household sector Y in period t is the sum of wage income,
i.e. the product of wage rate W and working hours L, and distributed profit, i.e. the
product of dividend D and the number of shares N.
Y =WL+DN |t (1)
Output of the business sector O is the product of productivity R and working
hours.
O = RL |t (2)
The productivity R depends on an underlying production function. The 2nd
axiom should therefore not be misinterpreted as a linear production function.
Consumption expenditures C of the household sector is the product of price P
and quantity bought X .
C = PX |t (3)
The axioms represent the pure consumption economy, that is, no investment
expenditures, no foreign trade, and no taxes or any other state activity. Albeit quite
obvious, it is worth to emphasize that all axiomatic variables are measurable in
principle. No nonentities like equilibrium or perfect competition are put into the
premises, neither are behavioral assumptions like rationality or utility maximization.
A set of axioms cannot be assessed ex ante because the full range of implications
is not immediately evident, yet:
The contents can be disclosed completely by deduction. It then brings
nothing to light which had not already been contended in the composite
of axioms. (Klant, 1984, p. 25)
Definitions are supplemented by connecting variables on the right-hand side of
the identity sign that have already been introduced by the axioms (Boylan and
O’Gorman, 2007, p. 431). With (4) wage income YW and distributed profit income
YD is defined:
YW ≡WL YD ≡ DN |t. (4)
Definitions add no new content to the set of axioms but determine the logical
context of concepts. New variables are introduced with new axioms.
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The economic meaning is rather obvious for the set of structural axioms. What
deserves mention is that total income in (1) is the sum of wage income and dis-
tributed profit and not of wage income and profit. Profit and distributed profit are
quite different things that have to be thoroughly kept apart.
To exclude human behavior from the set of structural axioms implies just this:
human behavior does not yield to the axiomatic method. This is the main conclusion
of our appraisal of orthodox and heterodox methodology. Therefrom does not
follow that behavior is totally excluded from the analysis. According to Hudík’s
Independence Proposition human behavior moves from the center to the periphery
of the domain. It can, in a second step, be consistently connected with the structural
axiom set via an own formal interface (for details see 2011b).
13 Profit: The stuff that makes the economy going
A satisfactory theory of profits is still elusive. (Desai, 2008, p. 10)
The business sector’s financial profit in period t is defined with (5) as the difference
between the sales revenues – for the economy as a whole identical with consumption
expenditures C – and costs – here identical with wage income YW :3
Q f i ≡C−YW |t. (5)
In explicit form, after the substitution of (3) and (4), this definition is identical
with that of the theory of the firm:
Q f i ≡ PX−WL |t. (6)
Using the first axiom (1) and the definitions (4) one gets:
Q f i ≡C−Y +YD |t. (7)
The three definitions are formally equivalent. Profit can be seen from different
perspectives. Taken together, the three perspectives make a comprehensive view.
If distributed profit YD is set to zero, then profit or loss of the business sector is
determined solely by expenditures and wage income. For the business sector as a
whole to make a profit consumption expenditures C have in the simplest case to be
greater than wage income YW . So that profit comes into existence for the first time
in the pure consumption economy the household sector must run a deficit at least in
one period.
This is rather obvious. At the moment we have nothing more than the household
and the business sector. As long as the households spend their wage incomes fully
the business sector will not make a loss but it will not see any profits either. Only
3 Profits from changes in the value of nonfinancial assets are neglected here, i.e. the condition of
market clearing O = X holds throughout. For details about changes of inventory see (2011c, p. 5).
Nonfinancial profit is treated at length in (2011a).
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if consumption expenditures are greater than wage income the business sector as
a whole will make a profit. Since wage costs are the flip side of wage income
and revenues are the flip side of expenditures there is a straightforward connection
between all magnitudes. This connection is established through the set of axioms
which is the shortest possible formal description of the economic system. The
axioms ensure that we do not get lost in the multitude of economic appearances.
The logical explanation of profit therefore consists in: revenues can only be
greater than costs if, in the simplest of all possible cases, consumption expenditures
are greater than wage income.
The household sector’s initial deficit in turn makes the inclusion of the financial
sector mandatory. A theory that does not include at least one bank that supports the
concomitant credit expansion cannot capture the essential features of the market
economy.
Once profit has come into existence for the first time (that is: logically – a
historical account is a quite different matter) the business sector has the option to
distribute or to retain it. This in turn has an effect of profit. This effect is captured
by (7) but it is invisible in (5). Both equations, though, are formally equivalent.
If nothing is distributed, then profit adds entirely to the financial wealth of
the firm. Retained profit Qre is defined for the business sector as a whole as the
difference between profit and distributed profit in period t:
Qre ≡ Q f i−YD ⇒ Qre ≡C−Y |t. (8)
Retained profit is equal to the difference between consumption expenditures
and total income. It is easily seen that retained profit is the complementary of
saving–dissaving.
14 Dissolving the muddle
. . . one of the most convoluted and muddled areas in economic theory:
the theory of profit. (Mirowski, 1986, p. 234)
The determinants of profit look essentially different depending on the perspective.
For the firm price P, quantity X , wage rate W , and employment L in (6) appear to
be all important; under the broader perspective of (7) these variables play no role at
all. The profit definition provokes a cognitive dissonance between the micro and the
macro view. It is therefore worthwhile to realize that equations (5) to (7) are not
only equivalent but indeed indispensable for a consistent view of profit.
It is of utmost importance that profit Q f i and distributed profit YD is clearly
distinguished. The latter is a flow of income from the business to the household
sector analogous to wage income. By contrast, profit is the difference of flows
within the business sector. Profit is not connected to a factor input. So far, we have
labor input as the sole factor of production and wage income as the corresponding
factor remuneration. Since the factor capital is nonexistent in the pure consumption
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economy, profit cannot be assigned to it in functional terms. And since profit cannot
be counted as factor income (cf. Knight, 2006, pp. 308-309, Schumpeter, 2008, p.
153), there is no place for it in the theory of income distribution. To treat profit as
factor income is a category mistake in orthodox as well as in heterodox economics.
The individual firm is blind to the structural relationship given by (7). On the
firm’s level profit is therefore subjectively interpreted as a reward for innovation
or superior management skills or higher efficiency or toughness on wages or for
risk taking or capitalizing on market imperfections or as the result of monopolistic
practices. These factors play a role when it comes to the distribution of profits
between firms and these phenomena become visible when similar firms of an
industry are compared. Business does not ‘make’ profit, it redistributes profit. The
case is perfectly clear when there is only one firm. It is a matter of indifference
whether the firm’s management thinks that it needs profit to cover risks or to
finance growth or whether it realizes the profit maximum or not. If the consumption
expenditures are equal to wage income and distributed profits are zero, profit will
invariably be zero. The existence and magnitude of total profit is not explicable by
the marginal principle.
Because of this, it is not wise to take the considerations of the individual firm’s
management as analytical starting-point and then to generalize. The microeconomic
approach is inherently prone to the fallacy of composition (cf. Eucken, 1989, p.
143). The profit definition entails a cognitive dissonance between micro and macro
but no logical contradiction. Ab origine total profit is a factor-independent residual
(Ellerman, 1986, pp. 61-65). This distinction is crucial.
We know from the history of science that entrenched classificatory
schemes and misleading descriptive vocabularies have impeded scien-
tific advance as much or more than the complexities and observational
inaccessibility of the subject matter. (Rosenberg, 1980, p. 114)
Models that are based on the collapsed definition total income ≡ wages + profits
are erroneous because profit and distributed profit is not the same thing.
Under the condition C = Y profit Q f i is according to (7) equal to distributed
profit YD. The fundamental difference between the two variables is not an issue in
this limiting case. The equality of profit and distributed profit is an implicit feature
of equilibrium models (Godley and Shaikh, 2002, p. 425), (Patinkin, 1989, p. 329),
(Buiter, 1980, pp. 3, 7). These have no counterpart in reality. In the real world profit
an distributed profit are never equal.
The barter-economic notion of surplus stands in no relation to profit as deter-
mined with definition (5). Neither is the neoclassical equilibrium condition, profit
rate = marginal productivity of capital, applicable in the pure consumption economy
because we have profit but no capital. And, since profit and capital must not be
treated like Siamese Twins, as they have since the classics, the tendency of the profit
rate to fall is perhaps in need of revision. This, in turn, must be of consequence for
the theory of crises.
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The question of whether in equilibrium profit is zero or not – Walras’s ‘ni
bénéfice ni perte’ – is of no concern within the structural axiomatic framework
because the notion of simultaneous equilibrium is no constituent part of it. In the
general case, profit or loss depends on consumer spending and profit distribution.
If in the limiting case distributed profit is zero in (7), then we have three logical
alternatives: C <Y , C =Y , C >Y . The first alternative entails a loss for the business
sector as a whole, the second means zero profit, and only the third leads to profit
which in turn is the indispensable condition for a reproducible economy. Hence the
real question is not about the existence of a zero-profit equilibrium, but how the
market economy can, and in fact does, avoid this predicament over a longer time
span.
The definition of profit (5) has another important implication. There is no real
residual that corresponds to the nominal residual profit. Real (O, X) and nominal
(Y , C) flows are to some degree independent. Profit belongs entirely to the nominal
sphere, in a real model it cannot exist (for details see 2011d). This is the defining
characteristic of what Keynes termed the entrepreneur economy (Rotheim, 1981,
pp. 575, 577, 579).
Distributed profit, in contrast, can have a real counterpart. If the product
market is cleared the whole output is shared between wage earners and receivers of
distributed profit according to their expenditure ratios. Since distributed profit has
no relation whatsoever to the production function the marginal productivity theory
of distribution cannot be true (for details see 2012b).
This much follows immediately from the first three structural axioms. It is
sufficient to logically and empirically refute orthodox and heterodox profit theories.
Without the correct profit theory as core any explanation of how the real world
economy works must fail. The correct profit theory in turn effects modifications in
all other parts of the theoretical edifice. To start from objective structural axioms
instead of subjective behavioral axioms involves the most profound change of
economic methodology.
15 Conclusion
The main results from the appraisal of methodology in economics have been sum-
marized in Mill’s Impossibility Proposition, the Physicist’s Nonentity Proposition,
Cournot’s Unfitness Proposition and Hudík’s Independence Proposition. From these
follows: behavioral assumptions, rational or otherwise, are not solid enough to be
eligible as first principles of theoretical economics. Hence all – orthodox and het-
erodox – endeavors to lay the formal foundation on a new site and at a deeper level
need no further vindication. The present paper suggests three nonbehavioral axioms
that comprise ten measurable variables as groundwork for the formal reconstruction
of the monetary economy. This makes it possible, first of all, to clarify the concepts
of income and profit and to resolve the perennial profit conundrum.
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